The most recent round of open conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has paused. For most Israelis and many observers, the summer of 2014 is turning into a memory of a war that began July 8 and ended with a tenuous ceasefire on August 28. Although it was the longest and deadliest of the three full-out wars in the last five years, Israelis view it as having a discrete start and an end; they lost 66 soldiers and six civilians, and hope for a good length of time before the next one.
Palestinians experienced the war differently. The enormity of the destruction in Gaza, including residential neighborhoods and civilian as well as military infrastructure and the far greater loss of life – over 2000 people, with the majority estimated to be civilians – is the most immediate impact.
But for Palestinians the different experience is beyond the physical damage. First, the war did not begin on July 8th, but is an inseparable continuation of the larger conflict, marked by statelessness and deep limitations on their physical movement and economic livelihood, military rule and regular violence against them. Israelis view the war as an aberration (even if frequent); for Palestinians it is just a more extreme part of the routine.
Second, Israelis take for granted that there was a war (or in Israeli parlance, a “military operation”) against Hamas, or against Gaza. For Palestinians, Protective Edge was none other than a war against all Palestinians. The situation galvanized the West Bank and diaspora Palestinians alongside Gazans, deepening the cohesion, while Israel authorities have for years sought a policy of separation designed to chip away at a unified Palestinian polity and even identity.
Thus each side’s trajectory continues to diverge; with policies that primarily deepen the animosity. Yet at the same time, neither side is unified or monolithic within.
Below are some of the main observations, questions, dilemmas, and speculations that arise following the war, and looking into the future.
- Internal Palestinian divisions. Although the Palestinian people may have united in solidarity with Gaza, various factions continue to struggle for influence: The ailing Fatah leadership has re-asserted its diplomatic strategy since the war, demanding a deadline for the end of Israeli military rule in the West Bank and threatening to approach the International Criminal Court; during the war, it was never totally clear whether Hamas Prime Minister in Gaza, Ismael Haniya, was in control, Khaled Mashal, the political leader of Hamas in Qatar, or a military wings of the organization inside Gaza; nor the exact role of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
- Internal Israeli divisions. Although news reports proudly paraded Israeli surveys showing extremely high levels of public support for the military and specifically the ground occupation, the government was deeply divided. This was not a “for and against,” split but a “for” and “for more” argument, with hawkish far-right elements in the governing coalition calling to extend the ground operation and rout Hamas. As Dahlia Scheindlin wrote, within small pockets of the public, opposition was based on arguments against disproportionate force, cyclical escalation, unattainable goals, negative political consequences and the colossal failures of previous wars.
- Israeli political fallout from the war. Noam Sheizaf observed that the third Netanyahu government is “even weaker after the war, mainly for reasons that have to do with the economy. Israel continues its slow slide toward recession, and the war will make it impossible for Finance Minister Yair Lapid to make good on his promises to the middle Class and not raise taxes. Lapid might be tempted to leave the government, and Netanyahu might be tempted to get Naftali Bennett out and try to resume talks with the Palestinians. It’s also unclear where Lieberman is heading. Early elections are not in anybody’s interest but Bennett’s, but we might end up with them anyway.”
- Palestinian political fallout from the war. From the early stages, it was clear that the war would serve to strengthen Hamas and undermine Palestinian political unity. Dahlia Scheindlin wrote: “In the short term, Hamas could easily become stronger; having become the defiant face of military resistance against Israel as diplomacy crumbles… The chances of a negotiated two-state agreement are even lower than when the Kerry talks broke down, if that’s possible. The internal Palestinian reconciliation process appears dead in the water. Once again, Israel will spend the next decade saying there is no partner, because if Hamas gets stronger, Mahmoud Abbas only gets weaker.
And as the war ended, Noam wrote that the result was precisely this. “Protective Edge won Hamas international recognition;… if the PLO held general elections tomorrow, Khaled Mashal could end up as chairman (which pretty much guarantees that general elections will not be held). After this war, any sensible person knows that Hamas will need to be part of whatever political arrangement is formed.” Polls taken immediately following the war support this statement, at least for the short-term.
- Changing legitimacy. The war stands to change the status of legitimacy of each party in the conflict. Samer Badawi, +972 Magazine’s writer who spent most of the war reporting from inside Gaza, believes the world knows that Palestinians “are neither unjustified nor unjust. They are, now in the world’s eyes as much as their own, victims of a flawed and brutal logic…That is why the terms of yesterday’s ceasefire…matter less than the new leverage, measured in international will, with which Palestinians now approach the negotiating table. In that way alone, Gaza has won and so, too, has the cause of justice.” Israel meanwhile came under enormous fire internationally, especially among the skeptical publics of Western Europe. The controversial UN Human Rights Council has established a committee to investigate the possibility of war crimes. Many outsiders feel that even self-defense against rocket fire on civilians did not justify such widespread civilian death and destruction.
However, these trends are not truly new but rather dramatic continuations of attitudes that have become prevalent over the last number of years. So far they have failed to make a major change in policy.
Still, there may be small shifts on certain aspects. For example, after a wave of anti-Semitic incidents in Europe related to protests over the war, some Palestinians have spoken out loudly against anti-Semitism as a stain on the Palestinian cause, as did guest writer Yasmeen Serhan in +972 Magazine. Meanwhile, near-weekly Israeli protests against the war grew to roughly 10,000. Combined with fears of external pressure and growing aspects of boycott, Israelis could begin to see a crack in the conviction that “status quo” is still an option. Unfortunately, Larry Derfner’s feature article exploring attitudes of the mainstream right shows little sign of change.